Ahead of Her Time: Eva Kolinsky and the Limits of German Gender Quotas

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As German political parties began to implement gender quotas, Eva Kolinsky was sceptical whether such quotas could succeed in increasing women’s presence in German legislatures. She predicted that women’s unequal share of home and family responsibilities and their dislike of traditional political structures would limit the quotas’ success. This article, written over a decade after Kolinsky’s work, assesses the accuracy of her predictions. It finds her scepticism of gender quotas’ ability to overcome women’s perpetual political under-representation partially warranted. While quotas have had a positive effect on German women’s political representation, they have not been quite as successful as initial observers had hoped. Kolinsky’s concerns about the hindrances to women’s political representation posed by their unequal share of household responsibilities and the male nature of German politics continue to explain this pattern. Although quotas alone have not been enough to ensure that German women hold an equal share of political power, they have been surprisingly effective, despite the persistence of indirect hurdles.

It would be a simplification to expect that ... women’s quotas or promises to improve opportunities could now unleash a participatory potential among women which had been dormant in the past and was only waiting to be tapped.¹

Even before most German parties adopted gender quotas for women’s parliamentary representation, Eva Kolinsky was sceptical as to whether the mere creation of party regulations would be enough to overcome hurdles to women’s political representation including women’s unequal share of home and family responsibilities and their dislike of traditional political structures.² Kolinsky’s pioneering work on women in German politics raises many questions, and offers some answers for scholars working today, two decades after the Greens first brought the issue of party gender quotas onto the political agenda in Germany.

This article systematically explores Eva Kolinsky’s arguments about the hurdles to women’s legislative representation and political leadership, even in an era of gender quotas. First I briefly provide information about the current state of women’s descriptive representation in the Federal Republic. I then discuss Kolinsky’s hypotheses about the limits of gender quotas and investigate whether they can explain the patterns described. Finally, I conclude by assessing the broader merits of her arguments.
At first glance, it appears that Eva Kolinsky’s scepticism concerning gender quotas was unwarranted. In the decades since the Greens and the Party of Democratic Socialism (formerly PDS, now the Left Party) promised that 50 per cent of their legislative candidates would be women, the Social Democrats (SPD) promised at least 40 per cent female candidates, and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) adopted a 33 per cent women’s quorum, women’s representation to the Bundestag, Landtage, and European Parliament have all increased dramatically. This has occurred in spite of the fact that the Free Democrats (FDP) and the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU) never adopted gender quotas. From the Federal Republic’s founding in 1949 until 1987, the Bundestag never contained more than 10 per cent women; today they occupy almost 32 per cent of the Bundestag seats. When Kolinsky studied women in the Landtage in 1991, the average state parliament contained only 16.6 per cent women, a figure that had risen to 32.6 per cent by 2005. Similarly, when the first direct elections to the European Parliament were held in 1979, 15 per cent of Germany’s MEPs were women; as of the 2004 EP election, this figure had climbed to 31 per cent.

While gender quotas have indeed increased women’s numerical representation in Germany – even within parties which have not adopted them – these quotas also have their limits. Women are still not represented in parliament proportionate to their share of the German population, which is over 50 per cent. Moreover, parties on the left (the Greens, Left Party, and the SPD) have been more likely to enforce their quotas in practice than the Christian Democrats. Figures 1, 2, and 3 depict the current gender balance of parliamentary party groups in the Bundestag, Landtage, and European Parliament, respectively.

In all three legislatures the Greens managed to exceed their 50 per cent quota for female representation. Both the Left Party, evincing an equally high quota and the Social Democrats surpassed their gender goals at the European level while falling

**FIGURE 1**

**BUNDESTAG IN 2006**

Source: http://www.bundestag.de/mdb/mdb_zahlen/frauen.html; author’s division into CDU/CSU.
somewhat short at the federal and state levels. In contrast, the Christian Democrats have fallen far short of their more modest quorum aims at all three levels of government. The FDP and CSU, neither of which applies a formal quota, evince the lowest share of women within their respective parliamentary party groups in most cases, although the liberals did send a higher percentage of women to the Bundestag than the CDU. It is also noteworthy, however, that quotas are not consistently implemented across Germany. Parties in Protestant, urban Länder have been more likely to implement quotas than those in rural, Catholic states.7 Highlighting this contrast, Figure 4 compares the composition of the Bremen and Baden-Württemberg state legislatures in 2004. Whereas in the former, all parties exceeded their quotas for women, all parties failed to meet their goals in the latter group.

Furthermore, even when parties implement gender quotas in choosing candidates for their electoral lists, all German parties fail to adhere to their quotas when selecting their candidates for constituency seats.8 During the 2002 Bundestag election, only 22.5 per cent of PDS candidates for a direct mandate and 31.5 per cent of the Green direct

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**FIGURE 2**

**LANDTAGE IN 2000**

*Source: Landtags Handbuecher.*

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**FIGURE 3**

**EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT IN 2004**

*Source: Author’s calculations based on European Parliament data.*
candidates were women, although both parties mandate a 50 per cent quota for their lists. Similarly, only 21 per cent of the CDU’s direct mandate candidates were female, despite the 33 per cent quorum. The FDP and CSU also had a lower percentage of women running for constituency seats than they sent to the Bundestag overall. Only the SPD approximated its quota; 37 per cent of its direct mandate candidates were women.

The discrepancies do not stop there. Even when women are elected to parliament, their numbers dwindle the higher up the political ladder they attempt to climb. The current Grand Coalition is headed by a female Chancellor elected in 2005, the country’s first to hold this office; however the Federal Cabinet contains 37.5 per cent women, down from 50 per cent under the Red–Green Government. Aside from Angela Merkel herself, women remain confined to less powerful ministries like family, health, and economic cooperation. One rung below these ministers only 11.5 per cent of State Secretaries (Staatsekretärinnen) are women. In the Bundestag every parliamentary party group (Fraktion) is led by a man, with the exception of the Greens, who have institutionalised the practice of appointing male and female co-chairs. Among the Bundestag’s 22 standing committees, ten have a woman chair. Just as in the cabinet, however, men tend to lead the most powerful committees, like those responsible for the budget, finance, foreign affairs, and internal affairs while women head committees on health, environment, family, tourism, and education.

At the Land level, there are no women currently serving as female state governors (Ministerpräsidentinnen); furthermore state-level executives often have fewer female
ministers than the federal cabinet; these women tend also to hold ‘softer’ cabinet posts than their male counterparts. As of May 2006 there were 62 parliamentary party groups in Germany’s 16 state legislatures and only 15 (24.2 per cent) were headed by a woman chair or co-chair. Not surprisingly, the percentage varied across parties. Not a single FPD Fraktion was headed by a woman; only one CDU caucus was led by a woman. In contrast, 63.6 per cent of Green Fraktionen were directed by females, either serving alone or with a male co-chair. Other parties along the left end of the spectrum had a mixed record: 33.3 per cent of the Left Party’s caucuses and 18.7 per cent of the SPD’s parliamentary party groups were chaired by women.

Personal interviews conducted with women holding seats in the Landtage suggest that the quotas have helped to increase the number of women in German politics but not necessarily to create an arena sympathetic to the goals of the feminists who advocated quotas. As one state legislator put it, ‘what people naturally still chuckle about . . . isn’t the quota or the activities of women in the party—that’s all completely normal. But what people still chuckle about are women’s political issues and their substantive content. That hasn’t changed.’

In sum, while quotas have greatly increased women’s presence in German parliaments, especially among left-of-centre parliamentary party groups, they have been less forcefully implemented within the CDU and/or in some states; women thus remain under-represented throughout Germany when compared to their total proportion of the population. Furthermore, quotas have been less effective at propelling women beyond deputy (Stellvertreterin) positions and onto the front-benches of government, especially in areas of ‘hard politics’.

Kolinsky’s pioneering concerns about the limited capacity of quotas to overcome women’s unequal political representation remain warranted. Her initial scepticism regarding their potential impact was grounded in two main concerns: First, that women’s disproportionate share of household and family responsibilities would leave them little time for politics; and, second, that the nature of political parties would remain unattractive to women, limiting their desire to pursue political careers, even if given the chance. I discuss Kolinsky’s beliefs in more detail below, examining whether or not they are supported by contemporary empirical evidence. I draw on personal interviews with female German politicians, as well as on the American and German literature regarding hurdles to women’s representation in these countries. Although no gender quotas are utilised in the United States – insofar as the winner-takes-all electoral system does not allow parties to alternate male and female candidates – traditional gender roles and socialisation experiences closely resemble those in Germany, with the result that American women must overcome many similar hurdles to their political careers.

THE UNEQUAL DIVISION OF HOUSEHOLD LABOUR

In 1989 Kolinsky observed:

Young women of today . . . hope to build a career in employment and also to have a family and children . . . but practical modalities of sharing duties and bearing responsibilities are still heavily tilted towards traditional role patterns. It is here that quota regulations may not become the participatory incentive which
party women expect them to be ... quota regulations are not enough, nor are small measures such as crèche facilities during congresses.14

Indeed, the long and irregular hours associated with a political career make it difficult for anyone to combine political office with childrearing and household tasks15 – especially if the office held requires the politician to spend considerable time in Brussels, Berlin, or in the state capital. Countless studies in the United States have found that American women with children at home display lower levels of political ambition than other groups, especially when they consider running for an office far from home.16

The German case seems to support this hypothesis, at least to a degree; the city-states (Berlin, Bremen, and Hamburg) – where the state legislature meets close to MPs’ homes – have always had higher proportions of women in their Landtage than the other states. This was the case even before the implementation of quotas.17 Joanna McKay’s contribution to this volume confirms that motherhood continues to pose obstacles to national political careers in Germany, just as Kolinsky predicted.

Interviews with women in the state legislatures further underscore such difficulties. One of the latter stressed that when women declined to run, ‘then it was usually justified by child care responsibilities. That they said, they just couldn’t do it all—even with the best possible assistance from their husbands’.18 The Greens’ parliamentary speaker for health-related issues in Bremen noted further:

A lot happens in the evenings and on weekends, even the meetings of party members. These kind of events can only take place in the evenings because, of course, the other members work all day. So most things take place at 7pm or 6pm. And you also have official events that you have to observe, as in my case, if the hospital has a new employee, I know, a chief doctor, then it’s simply expected that the speaker for health policy will show up. People look. The SPD and the CDU were there. Where were the Greens?

This, she continued, makes it difficult to combine work and family responsibilities:

... even if you are capable of managing your time well, there are certain things you can’t manage because you don’t know how long they will take. ... You are constantly working with unknowns. That is naturally difficult if you have hired someone, or asked someone, to look after your children and you consistently come an hour late. ... that makes both you and the other person dissatisfied. Who wants to always live with something like this? And yes, it’s stressful.19

Added to their logistical concerns about balancing family responsibilities and political work, however, many German women – especially in the Catholic south – report receiving hate mail or other social sanctions for entering politics.20 Besides receiving threatening anonymous letters, for example, one woman currently serving in the Baden-Württemberg state legislature, a mother of four, was told by the school principal that she should abandon her campaign or her children’s academic performance would suffer.21

American studies likewise reveal that women are less single-minded about pursuing a political career, and are more willing to retire from politics once elected,22 especially if their political role clashes with their family responsibilities,23 or if they
are unable to reach their policy goals. Similar results have been found at the local level in Germany. Consequently, many women interested in political careers wait until their children are grown to enter politics. This presents its own set of difficulties, however. As one member of the Baden-Württemberg state parliament observed:

But women often have another problem. When women go into politics, if they have a family, then they are already older than the men. For men families rarely play a role. ... Again and again there are discussions that a woman is already too old [to be nominated for a constituency seat]. Even with me there were individual voices that said, when I was 50, let’s take younger men who want to have a seat when they’re 30. And so you get competitive situations. But for women it is often the case that they are first free to go into politics after they’re done raising their children.

Thus, while quotas may help German women overcome discrimination in competition for a place on the party list, such considerations likely make it more difficult for women to secure party nominations for constituency seats, explaining the particularly low percentage of women nominated for direct mandates.

Even without children, women may focus more on the effects of a political career on their interpersonal relationships than their male counterparts. American women consider more factors than men before pursuing elective office. Having a supportive spouse has been shown to be of vital importance for American women considering running for office, while men often ignore spousal opposition. The same holds true in Germany. One interviewee noted that even without children a political career made it difficult for a politician just to spend time with her spouse or partner: ‘one also has to discuss how much time one will have left to spend together. I think both have to discuss how much time they want to spend together in the future and whether it’s OK [that there won’t be much time].’

In the US case, Ruth Mandel found that wives were more likely to support their husbands’ candidacy because it would add to family income or status. Husbands, by contrast, were less likely to support their wives’ campaigns because the family’s welfare was not as dependent on the formers’ success; further, husbands were less available than wives to work on campaigns because they had their own careers to attend to. Former Member of the Bundestag, Cornelia Schmalz-Jacobsen, reported similar experiences in Germany. Studies involving American politicians, however, found men increasingly reluctant to run because it required time away from their families. Interviews with German women in political office find some who can indeed combine childrearing and a political career. One mother of four school-age children who also served in the Baden-Württemberg Landtag argued, ‘wenn man will, man kann [if one wants to, one can]’; another mother running for the same legislature agreed, ‘es lässt sich alles organisieren [everything can be organized].’

Equally important is the fact that family responsibilities do not burden all women. In the United States, more women than men in the ‘eligibility pool’ (i.e., those qualified to run for Congress) are unmarried and/or childless. Women in the Bundestag also tend to be unmarried and/or childless, compared to their male counterparts. Indeed, German women are ever more unlikely to have children at all – especially those who are well educated and employed in good jobs (i.e., qualified candidates).
Gender quotas may work despite traditional family roles because parties can simply seek out the ever-increasing childless and/or single women in their organisation to fill spaces on the ballot.

Although family responsibilities are clearly not equally divided, and while German women seem to consider the probable effect of political careers on personal relationships more than their male counterparts, the traditional household division of labour has apparently not reduced the overall effectiveness of gender quotas as Kolinsky feared. Since their implementation, German parties have found considerably more women to run for elective office. Parties of the left generally have no problems filling or even exceeding their gender quotas – even for the European Parliament which involves travel far away from an MEP’s home.

The CDU may face greater problems filling its quorum than parties of the left to the extent that female members of this party are more likely to assume traditional gender roles, burdening them with more family responsibilities than women in other parties. Christian Democratic women in the Bundestag, for example, are more likely to be married with children than female MdBs from other parties.40 Similarly, parties in states with heavily Catholic populations and/or more rural residents – in other words those Länder with more traditional cultures – have more trouble finding female candidates than other parties in urban/Protestant areas,41 making it more difficult to fill their gender quotas, indicating that traditional roles may indeed explain quotas’ limited effects in increasing women’s presence in German legislatures.42

TRADITIONAL POLITICS: HIERARCHY AND COMPETITION

Kolinsky’s second argument as to why quotas were unlikely to overcome women’s under-representation derives from the nature of German politics. She hypothesised that traditional party politics reflected male rather than female values. Rather than responding to quotas which would allow them to enter the established political system, Kolinsky expected women to react coolly. She argued that the form and style of politics would need to change in order to attract women to political careers.43 She and other scholars have noted that while historically women have tended not to run for elective office, they have been strongly involved in social movements.44 The discrepancy between women’s under-representation in traditional party and legislative politics and their leading role in social movements, according to this view, owes much to the fact that women prefer the horizontal, informal relationships among social movement participants rather than the hierarchical, formalised relationships present in party politics.

Indeed, to this day German girls tend to be less interested in politics than boys,45 and fewer German women join political parties than German men; while women comprise 46 per cent of the PDS’s membership, they constitute only about a third of the SPD’s and Green’s members and approximately one-quarter of the CDU’s and FDP’s ranks.46 Several politically active women I interviewed who had decided either not to run for office, or to leave an elected position, cited the hierarchical nature of political parties as a strong disincentive for them to serve as parliamentarians.47 One former Social Democratic state legislator decided not to stand for re-election because she resented having to toe her party’s line in parliament when she disagreed with other
members of her party caucus. Another active party member decided not to enter politics because she expected to have a similar reaction to having to follow (mostly male) party leaders in parliament.\textsuperscript{48} This gendered dislike of male-normed party loyalty may account for women’s under-representation in political parties; this, in turn, makes it highly unlikely that German women will be represented in legislatures in proportion to their share of the German population any time soon. It also makes it more difficult for women to ascend to positions of power within their political parties\textsuperscript{49} and explains why many parties exceed their gender quotas for the European Parliament, known for its consensus, rather than confrontational, atmosphere.\textsuperscript{50}

In addition to shunning the hierarchical nature of party politics, women prefer \textit{power} as \textit{power to} rather than \textit{power over}.\textsuperscript{51} When asked why they run for elective office or decide to become a politician, for example, women in both Germany and the United States are more apt than men to maintain that they became involved out of a desire to act on a certain issue or to attain a specific policy outcome than out of a desire to hold a particular office or make a political career.\textsuperscript{52} As one state-level parliamentarian put it, women are more ‘\textit{sachorientiert} [factually-orientated]’ than men.\textsuperscript{53} Another explained, ‘I believe that with politics there has to be a piece of self-discovery involved; there has to be a piece of yourself involved. I don’t think one goes into politics unless one is personally touched by something, unless one sees something for which one must or can mobilize’.\textsuperscript{54} Other female parliamentarians interviewed reported getting involved in politics because they wanted to secure goals for unions, employers’ associations, or other interest groups in which they had been active.\textsuperscript{55}

Without gender quotas, it is rather unlikely that women intent on certain policy goals would consider running for elected office as a means to obtaining them. In contrast, where female candidates are actively recruited, women may be more likely to aspire to elected office as a route to achieving a desired policy outcome. Thus quotas may increase women’s ambition to hold office as a means of securing policy goals to which they were already committed by way of other forms of participation such as interest groups, social movements, or other work within a political party. While quotas may function in this way to increase women’s representation on the back-benches of parliament, they may be less helpful in propelling women to the front-benches.

Policy-oriented female MPs are likely to be content to work on core issues of interest as legislative committee members, rather than striving for positions as committee chairs\textsuperscript{56} or leadership posts within the parliamentary party group, as their policy-oriented male counterparts are more likely to do. Moreover, women’s focus on \textit{policy} rather than \textit{power} can explain their promotion to ‘softer’ ministries such as family, education, and the environment – issues that often attract women to politics – rather than more powerful, cross-cutting ministries such as budget and finance which touch on many policy areas.

Women may also be less interested in political careers or in ascending the ranks of their parties, Kolinsky reminds us, because the route to the top requires them to undertake activities in which men tend to engage more comfortably. In order to secure a ballot nomination in Germany, an individual must first distinguish herself from other party members in party meetings by making regular comments in discussions and bringing up proposals. Many German women indicate that they are quite
uncomfortable with public speaking and find this difficult to do. Women are also less likely to repeat what a previous speaker has said, even if they agree with the content. As a result, they are apt to talk less in party meetings and consequently have a more difficult time developing a reputation within the party (or they may decide not to get involved in party life at all). Once in parliament, women are also less likely to speak than men; in both parliamentary and party life, women’s voices are often not accorded the same attention as men’s. Rather than doing a lot of talking, German women tend to be more involved in action, serving as treasurer or organising social events or working in parliamentary committees to solve political problems. These roles are less likely to be rewarded with nominations for office or leadership positions within the parliamentary party group.

If a woman does develop a positive reputation within the party, the next step is to present herself as a potential candidate, either for a ballot nomination, committee chair, or party leadership post. This involves competing directly with others – especially when only one seat is available – and publicly declaring a candidacy. Both of these actions are unattractive for many women. As one state parliamentarian put it, ‘At the beginning I was a little afraid to enter into a competitive situation, especially with friends. It was uncomfortable for me. I think it’s the same for many women.’ She continued:

I know a woman, an SPD woman, who had a constituency seat which she quickly gave up when male competition emerged. And she was a really great worker. But somehow she couldn’t stand the competitive pressure and she withdrew very quickly. That happens. Of course, I also know of the reverse situation, but I do believe part of it is still a female problem.

Quotas may help overcome some of these problems by guaranteeing women spots on a party’s list or within the leadership, but they do not help with competition for a constituency seat or a ministerial post. Furthermore, quotas may only work if women sense that fellow party members are actually committed to implementing gender quotas. If conflict-averse women gain the impression that quotas are frowned upon by fellow party members they may reign in their ambitions.

Women may be especially reluctant to put their names forth for consideration in competitive posts because, at least in the US case, women are less confident than men about their chances of actually winning. One survey of both male and female members of the ‘candidate pool’ for the US Congress included lawyers, business people and educators; the study indicated that women were much less likely to consider (or actually undertake) running for political office than similarly placed men, in part because women were less confident that they are qualified to run. This lack of confidence in their own qualifications is especially detrimental to their political representation because women are more likely than men to believe that qualifications are an important factor in determining whether one should run for office. Like their American counterparts, German women also express doubt in their qualifications for office. One observer noted, ‘When thinking about running for office, women ask themselves if they’d be good at all aspects of the job from A–Z. Men take things much more lightly and say “I’ll figure it out as I go along”.’ Another state
representative agreed: ‘The self-confidence of women, that they have the self-confidence to do it [run for office]—that’s a hard nut to crack.’

Women’s lack of self-confidence seems closely related to the traditionally male-dominated political system observed by Kolinsky. Women may feel under-qualified to hold political office because party politics has been dominated by men for so long that they determine the normative standards of what constitutes a ‘politician’ – this is the standard by which women judge their qualifications, so it is no wonder they then come up short. Studies conducted in the United States have determined that white women and African Americans of both sexes are much less likely to show political ambition than white men, the group which has dominated American politics for centuries. Recent research has further established that the more women who run in visible political races, the more adolescent girls show an interest in future political participation – including running for office.

Gender quotas may alleviate such problems, at least to a degree, by virtue of the ‘role model’ effect. As a consequence of quotas, potential female candidates may come to believe that they, too, hold the appropriate qualifications for public office because more public officials share their characteristics. This pattern can explain partisan and regional differences in gender quota implementation. Where quotas are high, and successfully filled, more women may be willing to run for office because they have examples of success to inspire them. Further research pertaining to Germany suggests that women elected to city councils evincing higher female proportions are more likely to run again than women elected to councils where few of their kind serve in local government. Conversely, in the CDU and parties without quotas, female party members may be less confident of their likelihood of a successful political career and therefore less likely to run for parliament or party leadership positions.

Another way quotas help in overcoming women’s reluctance to embark on political careers derives from the fact that parties setting gender quotas need to find female candidates to fill the slots allotted to them; these parties are more likely to undertake training and recruitment efforts which, in turn, increase women’s self-confidence. German parties, for example, have begun to offer public speaking courses and mentoring for female aspirants, helping the latter feel better suited for a run for office and more comfortable with political institutions. As mentoring programmes become institutionalised and parties routinely encourage more women to run, individual females may become more confident in their own abilities, due to the outside confirmation of their qualifications.

German politicians often stress the role that outside encouragement had on their decisions to run for office. One city council member in Berlin observed, ‘I don’t think that, given my self image, I would have ever tried to obtain a place on the party list on my own initiative. The only reason I did was because people said ‘we need women and you’d be good’. Another Landtag candidate agreed, ‘I would have never come up with the idea of running for office. Without my mentor encouraging me I would have never had the courage [to seek my party’s nomination]’. One Berlin sample showed that most women who had chosen to run for local elected office did not usually join their parties with the goal of becoming politicians. Rather this desire emerged over the course of their experience within their parties. This suggests that a quota-driven party demand for women candidates may help stimulate women’s
political ambition – even if traditional hierarchical political structures do not change. In parties or areas where women do not receive such encouragement, however, traditional barriers to women’s political representation remain.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON KOLINSKY’S INSIGHTS

Because more than a decade has passed since gender quotas were introduced in Germany, we can now assess the merits of Eva Kolinsky’s initial scepticism regarding the ability of quotas to overcome women’s perpetual political under-representation. Despite her doubts that quotas would ‘unleash a participatory potential among women’, they have indeed increased women’s presence in German parliaments and in subsequent German delegations to the European Parliament, especially among parties of the left. Women’s presence at every level of the German political system – even at the level of Chancellor – has become an everyday reality.

As Kolinsky also feared, however, quotas have not erased all barriers to women’s political representation. Quotas have not been implemented equally across the German states and the Christian Democrats, especially, have fallen short of their quorum. In parties without a quota, women still remain scarce. Furthermore, in all German parliaments women’s presence falls below their proportion of the national population. While there is currently a Bundeskanzlerin, the country is devoid of any Ministerpräsidentinnen as of this writing. Women are still unlikely to lead their parliamentary party groups, or serve as cabinet ministers in ‘hard’ areas such as budget and finance, where considerable political power lies.

Kolinsky’s concerns about the hindrances to women’s political representation posed by their unequal share of household responsibilities, coupled with the male-normed nature of German politics, continues to explain the general pattern well. The increasing number of single and/or childless women, such as Angela Merkel, now provides political parties with a larger reservoir of female candidates from which their quotas can be filled. Hence the number of elected women has risen. However, as Joanna McKay’s contribution to this volume emphasises, mothers of young children, especially, continue to face high barriers to political participation. As a result, conservative parties or party organisations in rural or heavily Catholic areas where women are more likely to follow traditional gender roles do have trouble filling quotas. Furthermore, parties have faced few pressures for change concerning their internal decision making styles, involving late nights in smoke-filled rooms. German women continue to report discomfort with hierarchical political structures, public speaking and inner-party competition, as well as a lack of confidence in their own qualifications for office. This makes it difficult still for women to rise through the ranks of political parties and limits quotas’ effectiveness in increasing women’s political participation beyond the back-bench and beyond ‘soft’ areas of politics.

Given these hurdles, it is surprising that gender quotas have been as effective as they have. Their success in chipping away at male parliamentary monopolies certainly lies, in part, in the ‘role models’ afforded by growing numbers of women assuming political power within Germany, along with overt attempts by parties to mentor and encourage women within their ranks. These trends should further encourage women’s participation in parties that have successfully filled their quotas to date. The outlook
for greater female representation among conservative parliamentary delegations, however, is less optimistic. Furthermore, Kolinsky’s observations about the gendered nature of the behaviours necessary to move from the back to the front-benches once elected also suggests that quotas alone are not enough to ensure that women hold an equal share of political power.

What policy prescriptions can be drawn today from Eva Kolinsky’s work? First, insofar as quotas have effectively increased women’s political representation, the FDP and CSU could improve the gender balance within their parliamentary party groups through the use of such mechanisms. For quotas to be consistently effective across Germany, however, deeper reforms enabling women (and men) to combine family and career are needed. Recent increases in funding for crèches and moves toward Ganztagsschulen will aid mothers interested in political careers. Inner-party reforms, e.g., holding party meetings and events during the workday rather than evenings and weekends, are needed as well. A streamlining of the working week in Berlin and Brussels would enable all MPs to spend more time with their families, making elected office more appealing to mothers of young children.

In addition to the logistics of party work, however, internal party culture must also change if women are to feel fully comfortable participating. Rewarding dutiful completion of routine party work (such as serving as treasurer) as well as fiery rhetoric in inner-party debates with ballot nominations, for example, would benefit women. Selecting ballot nominees without demanding extensive public speaking, perhaps by relying on written statements instead, might also make running for office more appealing to German women. Routinely rotating chairpersonships in party working groups and parliamentary committees, rather than compelling MPs to compete directly for such positions, could propel women motivated by specific policy goals from the back-benches to positions of leadership. Mentors stressing the importance of positions in cross-cutting, ‘hard’ areas of politics such as budget and finance, coupled with skill-building courses in public speaking, for example, can also help women move into positions of political power.

All of the reforms recommended here go far beyond the mere introduction of gender quotas for ballot nominations, however. As Eva Kolinsky predicted before the implementation of quotas, changes to society and political culture need to occur before German women can participate at levels comparable to German men.

NOTES

3. The far-right parties, including the Republikaner, German People’s Union (DVU), and the National Democratic Party (NPD) have not adopted gender quotas. Due to their current lack of representation in the European Parliament, Bundestag, and most Landtage, these parties are not included in the analysis here.


10. Ibid., p.60.

11. The Danish parliamentary party group in Schleswig-Holstein is led by a woman, as is one of the two far-right Fraktionen.

12. Author’s interview with Ursula Arnold-Cramer, SPD member of the Bremen state legislature, 23 June 2005. The original quote in German is: ‘Worum natürlich immer noch geschmunzelt wird ... ist nicht die Quote oder die Aktivität von Frauen in der Partei, das ist alles ganz normal. Aber worüber noch geschmunzelt wird sind frauenpolitische Themen, und der Inhalt, das hat sich nicht geändert.’


18. Author’s interview with Silvia Schoen, Green member of the Bremen state legislature, 23 June 2005. The original quote in German is: ‘dann war es meistens begründet mit der Betreuung von Kindern, dass die einfach gesagt haben, die kriegen das nicht unter einen Hut. Selbst mit bester Männerassistenz.’

19. Author’s interview with Doris Hoch, Green member of the Bremen state legislature, 22 June 2005. The original quote in German is: ‘Vieles läuft abends und am Wochenende ab, selbst die Mitgliederversammlung innerhalb der Partei, sowas kann ja nur abends stattfinden, weil die anderen Mitglieder ja auch berufstätig sind. Also meistens findet es um sieben oder sechs Uhr statt. Und Sie haben ja auch noch offizielle Termine, die Sie Wahrnehmen müssen, weil das einfach erwartet wird, jetzt wird meinetwegen jemand irgendwo eingeführt neu in ein Krankenhaus oder weiss ich ein neuer Chefarzt und da erwartet man, dass man da als gesundheitspolitische Sprecherin da auch erscheint. Da wird geguckt, die SPD, die CDU war da, wo waren denn die Grünen? ... auch wenn Sie noch so fähig sind, Ihre Zeit zu managen, Sie können manche Sachen nicht managen, weil Sie nicht wissen, wie lange das dauert ... Sie arbeiten ständig mit Unbekannten. Das ist natürlich schwierig, wenn Sie jemanden beauftragen haben oder gebeten haben, auf Ihre Kinder aufzupassen, und Sie kommen dauernd eine Stunde später ... das macht einen und auch andere unzufrieden, und wer will dort immer mit sowas leben. Und es ist Stress, ja.’

21. Author’s interview with Dr. Monika Stolz, CDU member of the Baden-Württemberg state legislature, 30 June 2005.


28. Author’s Interview with Rita Haller-Haid, SPD member of the Baden-Württemberg state legislature, 29 June 2005. The original quote in German is: ‘Aber die Frauen haben oft auch ein anderes Problem. Wenn Frauen in die Politik gehen, wenn sie Familie haben, dann sind sie auch schon älter als die Männer, also bei Männern spielt Familie oft auch keine Rolle. Es gibt immer wieder Diskussionen, dass eine Frau schon viel zu alt wäre. Da gab es auch bei Mir Einzelstimmen, die gesagt haben, mit 50, nimm’ mal junge Männer, die mit 30 ein Mandat haben wollen, und das sind oft so diese Konkurrenzsituationen. Also bei Frauen ist es oft so, dass sie erst nach dem Kinderhaben den Rücken frei haben, in die Politik zu gehen.’


32. Author’s interview with Schoen. See also author’s interview with Arnold-Cramer. The original quote in German is: ‘man muss dann auch noch besprechen, wieviel Zeit einem dann noch miteinander bleibt. Ich finde, beide müssen besprechen, wieviel Zeit sie noch in Zukunft miteinander verbringen wollen und ob das ok ist.’

33. Mandel, In the Running, p.77; see also Thomas et al., ‘Legislative Careers’, p.404.

34. Schmalz-Jacobsen, Klimawechsel, p.57.


36. Author’s interviews with Stolz and Katrin Schütz, CDU candidate for the Baden-Württemberg state legislature, 11 July 2005.


41. Interview with Hedwig Prinz, CDU candidate for the Baden-Württemberg state legislature, 11 July 2005 and interview with Arnold-Cramer. See also Holuscha, Frauen und Kommunalpolitik, p.152.

42. It is not entirely clear from research to date whether traditional role patterns inhibit conservative women or those from certain regions, or whether their political ambitions meet with resistance from traditionally minded party leaders who prefer to nominate males. More research is needed to reach a definitive conclusion.

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46. McKay, ‘Women in German Politics’.

47. Author’s interview with Hülsbergen; interview with Marion von Wartenberg, leader of the Baden-Württemberg Landesfrauenrat, 29 June 2005; Anonymous interview, Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin for the SPD in the Bremen state legislature, 22 June 2005.

48. Author’s interview with von Wartenberg.

49. Angela Merkel’s rise to the top of the CDU occurred precisely because she denounced the previous male leader of the party, rather than loyally following him. Such inner-party crises are the exception rather than the rule, however.


51. Flammang, Women’s Political Voice, p.74. See also Holuscha, Frauen und Kommunalpolitik, pp.77–9.


59. Holuscha, Frauen und Kommunalpolitik, p.77; Berger, ‘Women in German Politics’.

60. Holuscha, Frauen und Kommunalpolitik, p.80. Author’s interview with Barbara Wulff, former SPD member of the Bremen state legislature, 21 June 2005.

61. Author’s interview with from Wartenberg.

62. Author’s interview with Haller-Haid. The original quote in German is: ‘Ich hatte am Anfang, und ich glaube, das geht vielen Frauen so, ein bisschen Angst, mich so einem Konkurrenzkampf, auch mit befreundeten Leuten, auszusetzen, das war mir unangenehm ... Also, ich kenne jetzt eine Frau, eine SPD-Frau, die aus einem Wahlkreis kommt, die es sehr schnell aufgegeben hat, als die männliche Konkurrenz dann kam, und sie selber ist eine ganz tolle Arbeiterin, aber irgendwo ertrug sie den Konkurrenzdruck nicht, und da hat sie sich sehr schnell zurückgezogen. Das gibt’s schon. Ich kenne natürlich auch den umgekehrten Fall, aber ich denke schon, ein bisschen ist es noch ein Frauenproblem.’

63. Holuscha, Frauen und Kommunalpolitik, p.77.

64. Fox and Lawless, ‘Entering the Arena?’; Fox et al., ‘Gender and the Decision to Run for Office’.


66. Interview with von Wartenberg. The original quote in General is: ‘Wenn Frauen sich überlegen, ob sie kandidieren sollten, fragen sie sich, ob sie alles von A bis Z gut Machen Können. Männer wiederum nehmen die sache viel leichter. Sie sagen “ich werde es irgendwie hinkriegen.”’

67. Author’s interview with Windler. The original quote in German is: ‘Da knacken wir dran. Wir knacken das selbstbewusstsein der Frauen, dass sie sich das selbst zutrauen.’
69. Githens, ‘Accounting for Women’s Political Involvement’; see also Holuscha, Frauen und Kommunalpolitik, p.72.
70. Fox and Lawless 2005.
73. Alternatively, ambitious women may join parties with quotas and multiple female officeholders rather than parties with fewer women in leadership positions. Author’s interview with Barbara Thannheimer, CDU member of county parliament, 27 June 2005.
74. Author’s interviews with Arnold-Cramer and Hülsbergen. See also Holuscha, Frauen und Kommunalpolitik, p.188.
75. Quoted in Geißel, ‘Beweggründende von Frauen beim Einstieg in die Politik’, p.52; see also Horstkötter. Frauen in der Kommunalpolitik. The original quote in German is: ‘Ich glaube nicht, dass ich von mir, . . . von meinem Selbstbild mich irgendwann um einen Listenplatz beworben hätte, wenn nicht einfach die Fragestellung gewesen wäre: ’Wir brauchen Frauen und du kannst es doch.’”
76. Author’s interview with Schütz. The original quote in German is: ‘Ich wäre nie alleine auf die Idee gekommen, für den Landtag zu kandidieren. Ohne meinen Mentor, hätte ich nie den Mut gehabt.’
78. Kolinsky, Women in West Germany, p.249.